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CONSTRUCTING A TOWER OF BABBLE: 
AN EXAMINATION OF PURPOSE IN 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Griffin S. Rubin* 
ABSTRACT 
“Purpose” is a key component of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence. While the 
Supreme Court has expanded the role purpose plays in various areas of constitutional 
analysis over the last half-century, the Court seemingly continues to muddy the waters as to 
purpose’s proper place in Establishment Clause cases. This Comment focuses on the 
function and operation of purpose in Establishment Clause cases in order to probe the 
complications and obstacles inherent to this area of constitutional law. By constructing and 
applying an analytical framework that examines modern Establishment Clause cases 
through the lenses of “conceptions of purpose,” “evidence of purpose,” and “indicia of 
impermissible purpose,” this Comment provides critical takeaways about the development 
and current state of the Establishment Clause—as well as potential future outcomes in these 
cases. Ultimately, the dispositive consideration in Establishment Clause cases is the 
utilization and weight given by individual Justices in any given case to the factors discussed 
in this Comment’s analytical framework. This conclusion demonstrates the judge-dependent 
nature of these cases and the value certain Justices place on the institutional legitimacy of 
the Supreme Court and the judicial branch as a whole. 
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“The purposes of a person’s heart are deep waters, but one who has insight 
draws them out.”1 
Towering four stories above one of the busiest intersections in Prince George’s 
County, Maryland,2 the Bladensburg Cross casts its long shadow upon any and 
all who pass.3 While the monument commemorates forty-nine individuals from 
the area who perished in World War I, certain residents of the county filed a 
lawsuit, arguing that the forty-foot tall Latin cross is an unconstitutional 
“government display” of religion.4 This controversy was the latest clash in the 
courts regarding the Establishment Clause, an area of jurisprudential turmoil that 
“leaves constitutional law scholars reminiscing wistfully about the elegance and 
 
 1. Proverbs 20:5 (New Int’l). 
 2. As of 2019, the estimated population of Prince George’s County is 909,327. QuickFacts, 
Prince George’s County, Maryland, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/princegeorgescountymaryland/PST040217 
[https://perma.cc/V7RQ-YGQ3]. 
 3. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n, 874 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 
2017), rev’d sub nom. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). The cross is also 
referred to as the “Peace Cross,” “Memorial Cross,” or “Bladensburg Memorial.” Am. Humanist 
Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n, 147 F. Supp. 3d 373, 376 (D. Md. 2015). 
 4. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 874 F.3d at 200, 202. The Court ultimately ruled 7–2 to allow the 
Bladensburg Cross to stand. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2089. For overarching analysis of the decision, 
see Michael W. McConnell, No More (Old) Symbol Cases, 2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 91, 92–102; 
Leading Cases, First Amendment—Establishment Clause—Government Display of Religious Symbols—Am. 
Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 133 HARV. L. REV. 262 (2019); Richard Schragger & Micah 
Schwartzman, Establishment Clause Inversion in the Bladensburg Cross Case 21 (Univ. Va. Sch. L. Pub. L. 
& Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 2019-54), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3463840 [https://perma.cc/8AJS-WA3N]. 
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simplicity of the Uniform Commercial Code or the Rule Against Perpetuities.”5 
A key component of modern Establishment Clause analysis is “purpose.” 
Within these cases, purpose examination has generally contained itself within the 
boundaries of the Lemon test;6 even the Court has dramatically expanded the role 
purpose plays in other constitutional analyses over the last half-century.7 To date, 
legal scholarship is practically devoid of an overarching, acontextual analysis of 
the role purpose plays in Establishment Clause cases.8 This Comment attempts to 
fill that void and demonstrate the sporadic and often-overlooked role purpose 
plays in this jurisprudential context. Moreover, while the examination of 
Establishment Clause case law that follows provides greater insight into the factors 
the Court considers in its deliberative process, the analysis ultimately 
demonstrates that the utilization of these factors and the weight given to each is 
entirely judge-dependent and is typically based upon consideration of the 
Judiciary’s institutional legitimacy. 
At the outset, it should be clear what this Comment does not do. First, this 
Comment does not enter the debate over the original purpose of the 
Establishment Clause,9 nor does it critique the myriad analytical approaches to 
the Establishment Clause propounded by judges and scholars.10 As well, this 
Comment does not undertake a normative analysis of the current state of affairs 
in this area11 or propose substantive solutions to the problems involved in 
Establishment Clause cases.12 Not only have these questions been addressed time 
and time again, but a thorough examination of each would imprudently broaden 
this Comment’s scope. 
This Comment focuses wholeheartedly but unconventionally on purpose 
analysis in Establishment Clause cases in order to probe the complications and 
obstacles fundamental to this area of law. Part I briefly summarizes the relevant 
 
 5. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 60 (2017) 
(quoting PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE 223 (2011)); see also Richard Albert, The Separation of 
Higher Powers, 65 SMU L. REV. 3, 23–24 (2012); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: 
The Supreme Court Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495–97 (1986). 
 6. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); see also, e.g., Josh Blackman, This Lemon 
Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and the Pursuit of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U. 
C.R.L.J. 351, 359–62 (2010). But see, e.g., VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10315, 
NO MORE LEMON LAW? SUPREME COURT RETHINKS RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT ANALYSIS 2 
(2019); Blackman, supra, at 389–90; Hal Culbertson, Note, Religion in the Political Process: A Critique 
of Lemon’s Purpose Test, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 915, 933–39; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 
43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 800–10 (1993). 
 7. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 850 
tbl.2 (2017); see also, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive 
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443–56 (1996) (free speech). 
 8. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 
532 (2016). 
 9. See generally Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1113, 1133 (1988). 
 10. See generally Joe Dryden, The Religious Viewpoint Antidiscrimination Act: Using Students as 
Surrogates to Subjugate the Establishment Clause, 82 MISS. L.J. 127, 136–45 (2013). 
 11. See generally Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 
1403–26 (2012). 
 12. See generally John M. Bickers, Of Non-Horses, Quantum Mechanics, and the Establishment Clause, 
57 U. KAN. L. REV. 371, 393–406 (2009). 
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history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence to set the stage for the analysis that 
follows. Part II addresses the theoretical aspects of the Comment’s analysis, 
specifically examining how the Supreme Court conducts purpose analysis and why 
purpose analysis is relevant in the first place. Part III details the methodology with 
which this Comment analyzes the relevant case law, while Part IV applies Part III’s 
methodological framework to the modern Establishment Clause canon. Finally, 
Part V reflects on these findings and forecasts a continuing state of confusion and 
disarray in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
I.  BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The Establishment Clause traces its roots to sixteenth-century Europe as 
political and religious philosophers such as John Calvin and Martin Luther began 
wrangling with notions of religious tolerance and secular authority.13 In crafting 
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the Framers frequently turned to the 
philosophical observations of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke for guidance in 
resolving issues of church and state.14 Although many understand the text of the 
First Amendment to mandate the separation of religion and the Republic,15 
historically speaking, the Establishment Clause most likely reflected the Framers’ 
desire for a deferential federal attitude toward the states in settling the 
establishment issue.16 As such, few cases and controversies involving the 
establishment of religion made their way to the Supreme Court prior to the 
Clause’s incorporation against the states.17 
When a taxpayer in New Jersey named Arch Everson challenged the decision 
by his school district’s board of education to reimburse parents of parochial school 
students for bus transportation, Justice Black led the Court in formally 
 
 13. See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 17 
(2000). 
 14. For excerpts and analysis tracking the development of colonial thinking toward religion, see 
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THOMAS C. BERG & CHRISTOPHER C. LUND, RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 14–65 (4th ed. 2016) (tracking the development of colonial thinking toward 
religion); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1158–66 (2d 
ed. 1988) (discussing the ideas and proposals of relevant Framers). 
 15. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 16. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 34 
(1998). But see Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 878 (1986). Using history and original intent to understand the 
Establishment Clause is a particularly contentious method of interpretation. See, e.g., JESSE H. 
CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 
RELIGION CLAUSES 5 (1995); FRANK S. RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES 3–5 (2007); see also Stephanie H. Barclay, Brady Earley & Annika 
Boone, Original Meaning and the Establishment Clause: A Corpus Linguistics Analysis, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 
505, 508–11 (2019) (discussing the application of corpus linguistics to understand the Establishment 
Clause’s meaning). 
 17. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 279, 282, 284 n.15 (2001) (identifying Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), and 
Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), as the only pre-incorporation Establishment Clause cases). 
For recent historical dives into the Establishment Clause, see Nathan S. Chapman, Forgotten Federal-
Missionary Partnerships: New Light on the Establishment Clause, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677 (2020); 
and Mark Storslee, Church Taxes and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 169 U. PA. 
L. REV. 111 (2020). 
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incorporating the Establishment Clause.18 While the Clause’s incorporation in 
Everson continues to generate debate among scholars,19 the decision marked the 
beginning of the modern Establishment Clause canon.20 At first, Establishment 
Clause cases immediately following Everson made singular, passing references to 
“purpose.”21 The first instance in which the Court overtly introduced purpose to 
the calculus of Establishment Clause analysis was in McGowan v. Maryland. 
Purpose dominated the language of the decision,22 and within a few years, scholars 
recognized that the Court had forever transformed Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.23 
Examining purpose in this line of cases may seem natural to law students 
considering six decades have passed since McGowan, yet it is still valuable to 
question why purpose plays a role in Establishment Clause cases in the first place. 
The text of the First Amendment nowhere declares that Congress shall make no 
law “with the purpose” of respecting an establishment of religion.24 What truly is 
the purpose of “purpose” in Establishment Clause analysis?25 To address this 
pivotal question, a clearer conceptual understanding of purpose is necessary. 
II.  WHAT PURPOSE IS AND ITS IMPORTANCE 
A.  WHAT ACTUALLY IS PURPOSE? 
While the word “purpose” is a basic notion in common parlance, it is anything 
but simple in the constitutional law context.26 To complicate matters further, the 
legal concepts of purpose, intent, and motive tend to be grouped together, and 
 
 18. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8, 15 (1947). Everson confirmed the Court’s previous 
holding that all clauses of the First Amendment were applicable to the states. See Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940); see also NOAH R. FELDMAN & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1565 (20th ed. 2019). 
 19. Compare Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the 
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1087–88 (1995) (pro-incorporation), with Conkle, 
supra note 9, at 1134–37 (anti-incorporation). 
 20. See, e.g., Donald L. Drakeman, Reynolds v. United States: The Historical Construction of 
Constitutional Reality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 697, 697–98 n.2 (2004). 
 21. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 
U.S. 203, 240 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting). 
 22. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961). 
 23. See, e.g., Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development 
Part II: The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 532–33 (1968) (“The legislative purpose 
and primary effect test . . . seems likely to have more than passing influence.”) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24. See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT app. at 296–97 (4th ed. 2016). 
 25. For further consideration of constitutional purpose analysis, see Lawrence A. Alexander, 
Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 925–26 (1978) (introducing 
a symposium dedicated to the topic). 
 26. The Supreme Court examines purpose, intent, or motive in a number of other 
constitutional settings. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (Free Exercise Clause); Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (Equal 
Protection Clause); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (Dormant 
Commerce Clause). 
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attempting to differentiate them is not straightforward.27 While some scholars 
insist clear distinctions exist among these terms,28 others dismiss these differences 
as minute and conceptually irrelevant.29 Moreover, disagreement endures as to 
whether analysis of purpose, intent, or motive even constitutes a coherent and 
reliable method of constitutional interpretation.30 
This Comment proceeds under two assumptions. First, the terms “purpose,” 
“intent,” and “motive” are synonymous.31 Second, purpose analysis is a viable 
form of constitutional analysis.32 While these assumptions may be reductive, 
developing the discussion here to consider these issues fully would expand this 
Comment beyond all reasonable limits. With this working definition of purpose, 
confronting the underlying question as to why purpose is even examined becomes 
more addressable. 
B.  WHY DOES PURPOSE MATTER? 
Scholars have theorized as to why purpose matters in various legal contexts,33 
but what makes this concept resonate so profoundly here?34 Recognizing the rights 
of individuals at stake,35 Professor John Hart Ely theorized that purpose analysis 
conducted by judges serves to affirm an elected official’s “duty to accord the 
entirety of his or her constituency equal concern and respect.”36 Other scholars 
 
 27. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436 n.48 (1997) (“This issue raises 
difficult questions . . . .”). 
 28. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 8, at 534–36; Gordon G. Young, Justifying Motive Analysis in 
Judicial Review, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 191, 207 (2008). 
 29. See, e.g., J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 
15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 956–63 (1978); Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit 
Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 37, 106 n.321 (1977). 
 30. See Frederick Schauer, Free Speech, the Search for Truth, and the Problem of Collective Knowledge, 
70 SMU L. REV. 231, 239 n.54 (2017) (noting relevant scholarship); see also, e.g., FELDMAN & 
SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 1181–82; Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative 
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 248–54 (1992). But see, e.g., ANDREI MARMOR, 
INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 132–39 (2d ed. 2005). 
 31. To avoid confusion, this Comment uses the word “purpose,” and its operational definition 
is an “objective, goal, or end.” Purpose, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Even the Supreme 
Court has used these terms interchangeably. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 
(1968); see also Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 VILL. 
L. REV. 1, 5–9 (1992) (discussing the distinctions between purpose, intent, and motive generally). 
 32. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 139 
(1980) (“[T]here are real-world cases where an unconstitutional motivation . . . can quite confidently 
be inferred . . . .”). 
 33. See, e.g., Michael Coenen, Campaign Communications and the Problem of Government Motive, 
21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 333, 341–56 (2018) (campaign communications); Deborah W. Denno, 
Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323, 331–37 (2017) (criminal law); Leslie Kendrick, Free 
Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1278–86 (2014) (free speech). 
 34. Even though the Supreme Court has insisted over time that purpose is irrelevant “in 
constitutional adjudication[,] . . . in reality, [purpose] matter[s].” Lynn E. Blais, The Problem with 
Pretext, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 963, 975 (2011). 
 35. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 
1205, 1211 (1970). 
 36. ELY, supra note 32, at 243 n.10. Professor Ely asserts that “select[ing] people for unusual 
deprivation on the basis of race, religion, or politics, or even simply because the official doing the 
choosing doesn’t like them” defies constitutional norms. Id. at 137. And “[w]hen such a principle of 
selection [is] employed, the system has malfunctioned: indeed we can accurately label such a selection 
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maintain that purpose analysis is an innate aspect of judicial review because “even 
a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.”37 Professor 
Richard Fallon understands this analogy to mean: 
[W]e often cannot even characterize an act without understanding what 
motivated it. Within deeply entrenched ethical structures, what people (like 
dogs) are often owed is concern, care, or respect, and not necessarily a 
particular outcome. When constitutional doctrine is viewed against this 
background, there is nothing mysterious about the idea that the quality of 
governmental acts, and hence their constitutionality, should sometimes 
depend on their purposes.38 
Distilled to their cores, these explanations for purpose analysis stem from 
concerns for legitimacy.39 
The Supreme Court has long concerned itself with its institutional legitimacy,40 
both explicitly41 and implicitly.42 While abstract and theoretical examinations of 
legitimacy are pervasive,43 scholars examining purpose analysis tend to identify 
differing components of judicial legitimacy.44 For instance, Professor Scott 
 
a denial of due process.” Id. 
 37. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (Little, Brown & Co. 1923) (1881); 
see Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 
590 (1975); Clark, supra note 29, at 963. 
 38. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 93 (2001). Relatedly, 
Professor Fallon asserts, “When political officials act for constitutionally illegitimate reasons, they 
forfeit any reasonable claim to judicial deference.” Id. at 94. 
 39. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 53–54 (1996); 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 323–25 (1997); 
Joseph Landau, Process Scrutiny: Motivational Inquiry and Constitutional Rights, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
2147, 2152 (2019); Michael D. Gilbert & Mauricio A. Guim, Active Virtues, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3–7), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3366512 [https://perma.cc/J3HG-5JAJ]; 
Micah Schwartzman, Official Intentions and Political Legitimacy: The Case of the Travel Ban 6–11 (Univ. 
Va. Sch. L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 22, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3159393 [https://perma.cc/RU9J-GPBV]. 
 40. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rice & Jack Boeglin, Confining Cases to Their Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. 865, 
898 (2019) (“In its most introspective moments, the Supreme Court has openly pondered how best 
to preserve the foundations of its own legitimacy.”). 
 41. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865–66 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(“The Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself 
in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to 
declare what it demands.”) (emphasis added); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
432, 441 (1985) (considering legitimacy explicitly). 
 42. See Samuel R. Olken, The Ironies of Marbury v. Madison and John Marshall’s Judicial 
Statesmanship, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 391, 436–38 (2004). For further discussion of the Court and 
its legitimacy, see generally Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of 
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 
(1994). 
 43. E.g., Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 115–32 (2003); 
Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court 
Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 190–95, 196–97 (2013); Leslie Green, Law, 
Legitimacy, and Consent, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 795, 803–25 (1989); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and 
the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1813–39 (2005); David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power 
and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 778–85 (2009). 
 44. Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240, 2240 
(2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT (2018)) 
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Idleman identifies participatory equality of citizens and moral resonance of law as 
the elements of legitimacy safeguarded by purpose analysis,45 while Professor 
Brandon Garrett emphasizes that failure by the courts to root out improper 
purpose in laws leads to “a system-wide delegitimizing effect.”46 Professor Andrew 
Koppelman posits that, specifically in Establishment Clause cases, purpose 
analysis serves to prevent government from “declar[ing] . . . religious truth.”47 
Taking these theoretical conceptions together with the relevant history 
illuminates a plausible explanation for purpose analysis in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. While the United States has always been “an asylum to the 
persecuted and oppressed of every nation and religion,”48 the intersection of 
church and state in America has never been simple.49 This issue is fundamental 
to the fabric of American society, interwoven with the deeply held and sometimes 
conflicting convictions of “a religious people whose institutions presuppose a 
Supreme Being.”50 When the Supreme Court observed a near-instantaneous jump 
in Establishment Clause cases following Everson, the Court likely envisaged the 
storm of sectarian turmoil and accompanying legitimacy concerns brewing on the 
horizon. As a result, the Justices ostensibly integrated purpose into the Court’s 
analysis of Establishment Clause issues to preserve the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court and the government as a whole in the eyes of the citizenry.51 
III.  FINDING PURPOSE: A METHODOLOGY 
Discussing purpose in the abstract is sufficiently complicated; selecting a 
concrete path for analysis is even more so. While the analysis that follows is far 
from comprehensive, the results shed light on the methods used and conclusions 
drawn by the Supreme Court pertaining to purpose in Establishment Clause 
cases.52 The Court has handed down sixty Establishment Clause decisions in the 
 
(“Legitimacy is a complex and puzzling concept.”). 
 45. See Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the Establishment Clause, 12 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 71 (2002). 
 46. See Brandon L. Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV. 1471, 
1476 (2018). 
 47. Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 88 (2002). 
 48. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 
(1785), reprinted in MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 14, at 46. 
 49. See Mark W. Cordes, Politics, Religion, and the First Amendment, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 111, 113–
14 (2000); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New Religion and the Constitution, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1397, 1403–11 (2003) (outlining the general mentalities of Americans toward religion). 
 50. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). But see Mark L. Movsesian, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and the Future of Religious Freedom, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 722–30 (2019) 
(describing the increase in Americans identifying as “nones”—people who do not affiliate with an 
organized religion). 
 51. For in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy, see FALLON, supra note 44, at 
20–46. 
 52. See TRIBE, supra note 14, § 14-14, at 1280 (discussing the difficulties in developing a 
coherent analytical framework to examine purpose in Establishment Clause cases). Involving purpose 
analysis in its Establishment Clause cases went against the Court’s traditional observation of the “wise 
and ancient doctrine . . . not [to] inquire into the motives of a legislative body or assume them to be 
wrongful.” John Donovan, Unconstitutional Motivation Analysis and the First Amendment: The Further 
Demise of a Wise and Ancient Doctrine, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 271, 272–74 (1983) (quoting United 
States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting)). 
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modern era that remain precedential.53 Part IV begins by collecting and sorting 
modern Establishment Clause cases by the types of statutory purpose. First, each 
case is examined for a per se violation of the Establishment Clause.54 If the 
government action at issue in a case is facially neutral, each is subsequently 
grouped by the purpose designation given by the Supreme Court.55 This 
categorization breaks out into five groups:56 (1) secular purpose; (2) primary 
secular purpose; (3) religious purpose; (4) primary religious purpose; and (5) 
miscellaneous examination or no purpose examination.57 The analysis then turns 
to three other important questions when decisions examine purpose:58 (1) how 
did the Justices identify the purpose; (2) what evidence did the Justices use to 
identify such purpose; and (3) which “indicia of impermissible purpose,” if any, 
were involved in their decision. 
A.  CONCEPTIONS OF PURPOSE 
Of the questions frequently posed about purpose analysis, the “ascertainability” 
concern is almost always raised.59 On numerous occasions, Justices have pointed 
to the “extreme[] difficult[y]” in “ascertain[ing] the motivation, or collection of 
different motivations, that lie behind [governmental action].”60 While academics 
have inspected and dissected various notions of purpose in the constitutional 
setting,61 Professor Fallon has posited a simple and effective method to examine 
 
 53. Because certain Establishment Clause cases more directly concern standing, this Comment 
does not consider these cases to avoid distorting the analysis. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 
85 (1968). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID 
L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 128–30 
(7th ed. 2015). 
 54. Cf. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (violating the Equal Protection 
Clause on its face). Professor Fallon refers to this type of constitutional test as a “forbidden-content” 
test. See FALLON, supra note 38, at 78. 
 55. See FALLON, supra note 38, at 79 (defining purpose tests). 
 56. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41–42 (1980) (per curiam); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. 
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14–17 (1989). 
 57. Great effort is made to avoid discussing the complexities and nuances inherent in a 
government act that has multiple purposes. For general analysis of mixed-motives examination, see 
Andrew Verstein, The Failure of Mixed-Motives Jurisprudence, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 725, 732–41 (2019), 
and Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1114–21 (2018). See 
also Daniel O. Conkle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause, 67 IND. L.J. 1, 3–4 
(1991) (discussing mixed-motives analysis in the Establishment Clause context). This Comment also 
does not engage with a major issue Justice Scalia saw in applying purpose analysis in Establishment 
Clause cases—whether government action violates the Establishment Clause for furthering a religious 
purpose when religious and secular views happen to align. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF 
CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE POLITICS OF DISRUPTION 112 (2018). 
 58. See infra Parts IV.B.–D. 
 59. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383–84 (1968); Paul Brest, Palmer v. 
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 
119. 
 60. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383–84); see 
Calvin Massey, The Role of Governmental Purpose in Constitutional Judicial Review, 59 S.C. L. REV. 1, 
10–12 (2007) (discussing the difficulty the Court faces in “agree[ing] on the method of locating 
purpose, even when agreement is reached that purpose is relevant”). 
 61. See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, Ideological Drift and the Forgotten History of Intent, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1, 66–73 (2016); Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 
1861–71 (2008); Jarrod Shobe, Enacted Legislative Findings and Purposes, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 669, 694–
COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
10 SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 74:1 
how judges identify or construct governmental purpose.62 His model serves as this 
Comment’s framework to analyze Establishment Clause cases.63 
Although Professor Fallon believes purpose is a “protean concept capable of 
assuming different forms,” there are three applicable and distinct ways in which 
the Court can find or derive the purpose of a law or government action.64 First, 
judges may subjectively identify the purpose with which government actors take 
action and subsequently determine the extent that such purpose motivated 
others.65 Second, judges may impute a collective intent to make sense of specific 
language or action.66 Governmental conduct may have an objective purpose67 
indicated by the “performance of actions [that] . . . because of what they involve, 
are typically motivated by a certain rationale and are reasonably interpreted as 
being so motivated.”68 Finally, judges may find legislative purpose from the 
“expressive meaning” of a statute.69 This method begins with a judge attributing 
an expressive meaning to some statute or official action and concludes with the 
imputation of an objective purpose to communicate such meaning.70 
Applying this conceptual framework of purpose to modern Establishment 
Clause cases makes clearer whether a pattern (or lack thereof) exists as to the 
manner in which the Supreme Court identifies purpose in these cases. 
B.  EVIDENCE OF PURPOSE 
The perception of a law or governmental action’s purpose represents the macro-
 
95 (2019). 
 62. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 534–54. Fallon uses the terms “intent” or “intention” in the same 
manner this Comment uses the term “purpose.” See id. at 535–36. 
 63. For purposes of this Comment, legislative purpose includes the purpose with which a 
government actor takes a particular action. 
 64. Fallon, supra note 8, at 553. While Professor Fallon explores more than these three methods, 
he ultimately concludes that the three subjective conceptions of purpose are effectively the same in 
that they involve “identifying the forbidden intentions of individual legislators and then determining 
how many other legislators likely had similar motivations.” Id. at 541. Further, Professor Fallon’s 
“Categorically Ascribed Objective Intent” method references per se violations of the Establishment 
Clause. See id. at 544–45. As such, for purposes of this Comment, this conception of purpose is 
synonymous with per se violations of the Establishment Clause. 
 65. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 544–45. For the different ways this subjective conception of 
purpose forms, see id. at 538–40. 
 66. Id. at 541–43. “[A] statute’s meaning is the meaning that an informed observer would 
understand it as having in its semantic context.” Id. at 542; see John F. Manning, What Divides 
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 91–92 (2006). But see SANFORD LEVINSON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 124–25 (1988). 
 67. While Fallon refers to a number of these conceptions of purpose as objective, at points even 
he implicitly questions the nature of these “objective” purpose conceptions. See Fallon, supra note 8, 
at 549 (emphasizing the term “objective” with quotation marks). 
 68. Id. at 543 n.83. Fallon acknowledges that this method “often overlap[s] . . . with a conception 
of . . . [purpose] based on the imagined subjective intentions of a majority of the actual legislature.” 
Id. at 544. 
 69. Id. at 549. Expressive theories “tell actors—whether individuals, associations, or the State—
to act in ways that express appropriate attitudes toward various substantive values.” Elizabeth S. 
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
1503, 1504, 1527 (2000). For instance, when American antiwar protestors publicly burned the 
American flag in the mid-1960s, such action manifested one’s state of mind and belief that the 
United States’s involvement in the Vietnam War was wrong. See id. at 1506. 
 70. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 549. 
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level of the Court’s purpose analysis, but how exactly do the Justices arrive at such 
conclusions? The micro-level examination making up the whole of an identified 
purpose is the evidence considered by the Court, each piece coming together to 
construct an overarching purpose.71 While the types of evidence examined vary 
greatly across different areas of constitutional law,72 the framework used here 
derives from the works of several commentators writing about the Equal 
Protection Clause.73 
In general, the Justices consider five broad types of evidence to determine 
purpose: textual, procedural, contextual, pretextual, and effectual.74 First, on the 
most basic level, the text of the statute can be examined.75 Second, the Court 
considers contextual evidence, such as “historical background demonstrating past 
discriminatory acts[] and . . . departure[s] from the usual substantive 
considerations governing the decision.”76 Third, the Justices look to procedural 
evidence, which is the sequence of events leading to “passage, the . . . procedure, 
and the . . . history accompanying”77 passage or authorization of the statute or 
action in question, respectively. Procedural evidence is particularly noteworthy for 
its array of information that indicates purpose to judges, yet the Court focuses on 
official statements78 and other actions by relevant government actors.79 Fourth, 
the Justices may find pretextual evidence when there is an “utter failure of 
alternative explanations to offer legitimate ends along with means that really 
advance those ends.”80 Finally, the Court may examine effectual evidence and 
observe the real-world impact of a statute or action to identify purpose.81 While 
 
 71. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Theory of Judicial Candor, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2265, 2276 
(2017) (“In imputing beliefs or emotional attitudes to people in nonlegal contexts, we rely on a mix 
of evidentiary factors to reach judgments in which we frequently have justified confidence.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 
(1977). 
 73. See infra notes 74–83 and accompanying text. Both Equal Protection Clause and animus 
cases serve as great templates for examining evidence in Establishment Clause purpose analyses due 
to the similarity of the clauses’ underlying concerns. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Faith, Reason, and Bare 
Animosity, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 125, 137 (1999); Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 133; Timothy L. Hall, 
Religion, Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 50 (1992); Elizabeth D. Katz, “Racial and Religious 
Democracy”: Identity and Equality in Midcentury Courts, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1467, 1479–81 (2020). But see 
Caroline Mala Corbin, Intentional Discrimination in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 67 ALA. L. REV. 
299, 307 n.57 (2015) (“The doctrine for the [Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses] is 
obviously not completely parallel.”). 
 74. See Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 
183, 245–46. 
 75. See id. at 245; Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1268–
69 (2018). While the majority of scholarly work analyzing purpose focuses on the statutory context, 
this Comment expands the analysis to other settings from which purpose can be derived, such as the 
governmental displays of symbols. 
 76. Carpenter, supra note 74, at 245–46; see also Ely, supra note 35, at 1220. 
 77. Carpenter, supra note 74, at 246; see also Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate 
Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 516 (2003). 
 78. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
133, 138–43 (2018). 
 79. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 74, at 248, 257–79. 
 80. See id. at 246. 
 81. See id.; see also Huq, supra note 75, at 1274–77. It is important to note that analyzing the 
effects of a statute here involves two steps: (1) observing the real-world impact of a statute; and (2) 
determining whether this impact was intended by the enactors. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 74, at 
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the Justices have looked to effectual evidence in many contexts, examining its 
impact to discern purpose is particularly controversial.82 Nevertheless, the impact 
of a statute or governmental action may carry evidentiary value for the Court when 
conducting purpose analysis.83 
Analyzing modern Establishment Clause cases through the lens of these five 
evidentiary methods helps answer the following questions: First, what types of 
evidence do the Justices look to in Establishment Clause cases? Second, are there 
particular types of evidence the Court favors or disfavors when conducting 
purpose analysis in these cases? Finally, how do these pieces of evidence come 
together to produce the Court’s conception of purpose in Establishment Clause 
cases? 
C.  INDICIA OF IMPERMISSIBLE PURPOSE 
When analyzing purpose in Establishment Clause cases, the Justices look for 
specific content in the evidence evincing an illicit end or objective.84 But what are 
these “indicia of impermissible purpose”?85 Similarly to evidence of purpose, case 
law and scholarly work involving the Equal Protection Clause provide examples 
of how the Court views specific subject matters as manifestations of 
constitutionally proscribed purpose.86 
Building upon previous models designed to detect improper purpose, four 
general indicia make up the analytical framework utilized herein.87 First, religious 
 
279–81. Examining statutory effects in this way differs from the analysis under the Lemon test’s effects 
prong, which only involves the first of these two analytical steps. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602, 612 (1971) (“[The statute’s] principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion . . . .”). 
 82. Compare Frederick Mark Gedicks, Motivation, Rationality, and Secular Purpose in Establishment 
Clause Review, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 677, 690–91, with Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a 
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 129 (1992). Professor Carpenter contemplates possible 
justifications for examining effects in the context of purpose analysis. See Carpenter, supra note 74, 
at 246 n.229. 
 83. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12–23 (2013) (analyzing 
the interaction of purpose and impact in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence). More likely than 
not, the Justices “use the balance of consequences as evidence of [purpose], but not as conclusive 
evidence, not as the equivalent of [purpose].” See Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 55, 63 
(1997). Professor Fallon argues that “effects-based tests can reasonably be viewed as [a] surrogate[] for 
purpose tests.” FALLON, supra note 38, at 91. 
 84. This Comment identifies when the Court has found constitutionally impermissible purpose 
under the Establishment Clause but does not evaluate those findings here. For further discussion, 
see Brest, supra note 59, at 116–19; Conkle, supra note 57, at 5–8; and Ian Haney-López, Intentional 
Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1796–98 (2012). 
 85. It is imperative to distinguish impermissible purpose from discriminatory purpose. While 
debate persists as to what actions specifically involve impermissible purpose in Religion Clauses cases, 
discriminatory purpose represents a clear standard of mental awareness in acting with a specific desire 
to affect a particular group. Compare Conkle, supra note 57, at 8–12, with Goodwin Liu, Racial Justice 
in the Age of Diversity, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1977, 1978 (2018). 
 86. See infra notes 90–102 and accompanying text; see also Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and 
Cultural Identity: Reconciling the Jurisprudence of Race and Religion, 73 IND. L.J. 119, 138–40 (1997). 
Especially in the context of race and the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court looks for 
articulated indicators of forbidden purpose. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) 
(“[T]he enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority.” 
(emphasis added)), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 87. See infra Part IV.D. While these indicia are closely related and their boundaries are 
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animus can demonstrate impermissible purpose. While no concrete legal 
definition for animus exists,88 in this context, the term refers to taste-based 
discrimination,89 and its presence can cause serious harm to those affected.90 
When evidence makes reference to a group’s traits,91 stereotypes,92 or stigmas,93 
impermissible purpose typically abounds.94 Second, classification can signal 
improper purpose. While the distinction between classification and animus is 
imprecise,95 classification refers to state action intended to press a religious class 
“into service for purposes of persecution, rather than for other, benign 
purposes.”96 Classification may result in the “[e]ncouragement of prejudice,”97 
which would reveal an even more decidedly impermissible purpose.98 Third, 
subordination may suggest the presence of impermissible purpose. Even though 
the notions of classification and subordination arise from the same conceptual 
basis of group dynamics, subordination takes classification a step further by 
seeking “to produce and reinforce status hierarchies between different social 
groups.”99 Like classification, subordination can also give way to encouragement 
of prejudice but in a distinctly more intentional manner.100 Finally, a lack of 
government impartiality may signal forbidden purpose. When a “sense of breach 
 
amorphous, analyzing the Establishment Clause cases through these lenses provides useful insight 
into the inner workings of this area of constitutional jurisprudence. 
 88. See generally WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 
(2017). 
 89. See Huq, supra note 75, at 1243–44; Clark, supra note 29, at 954; see also U.S. Dep’t of Agric. 
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (describing animus as “a bare congressional desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group”); Daniel O. Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives: Constitutional Principle 
and Judicial Prudence, 48 STETSON L. REV. 195, 198 (2019) (“[T]he Constitution demands that every 
law serve a public-regarding interest or objective or, at a minimum, that it at least be intended to do 
so.”). 
 90. William E. Adams, Jr., Is it Animus or a Difference of Opinion? The Problems Caused by the 
Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 467–77 (1998) (detailing 
the effects of anti-gay animus on gay communities). 
 91. See Huq, supra note 75, at 1243. 
 92. See Hall, supra note 73, at 57–60. 
 93. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 
942–43 (1989). Interestingly, Professor Robert Tsai posits that the concept of stigma can affect the 
person or group engaging in stigmatization, which involves “branding the wrongdoer” as 
discriminatory and having acted in an unconstitutional manner. First Mondays, OT2018 #18: 
“Rorschach Test”, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/02/ot2018-18-
rorschach-test/ [https://perma.cc/3FAY-WWLG]. 
 94. See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Religious Antiliberalism and the First 
Amendment, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1341, 1399 (2020) (“[A]nimus doctrine holds that the government 
cannot engage in acts driven by animus toward a particular religion or religious group.”). 
 95. See Huq, supra note 75, at 1256. 
 96. Hall, supra note 73, at 56–57; see Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the 
Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1839–41 (2009) (detailing Justice O’Connor’s 
similar line of thought). 
 97. Strauss, supra note 93, at 944. 
 98. For more on classifications and divisions in Establishment Clause cases, see Richard W. 
Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1681–1708 (2006). 
 99. See Huq, supra note 75, at 1257–58; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559–60 (1896) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 100. See Koppelman, supra note 96, at 1841; see also Benjamin Eidelson, Respect, Individualism, 
and Colorblindness, 129 YALE L.J. 1600, 1606–08 (2020) (discussing subordination in the context of 
race). 
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of faith between the governor and the governed” occurs,101 the existence of 
impermissible purpose is more likely.102 This amorphous indicator overlaps with 
the other indicia while simultaneously representing a catch-all for any state action 
lending itself to the delegitimization of the political system.103 
Analyzing modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence in this manner will 
answer three key questions: First, is the presence of at least one impermissible 
purpose indicia a necessary condition for finding a violation of the Establishment 
Clause? Second, is there a trend as to how many indicia must be identified to serve 
as a sufficient condition for finding a violation of the Establishment Clause? 
Finally, are these indicia, and thereby purpose analysis generally, even correlated 
with the outcomes in Establishment Clause cases? 
IV.  FROM MCGOWAN TO THE BLADENSBURG CROSS: A COMMON 
LAW ANALYSIS 
When the Court conducts purpose analysis in Establishment Clause cases, the 
Justices overwhelmingly tend to find a secular purpose. But this conclusion, 
without further unpacking, fails to comprehensively encapsulate relevant case law. 
The analysis that follows seeks to provide context for this finding. 
A.  ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES BY TYPES OF PURPOSE 
1.  Per Se Violations 
First, there are the cases that facially violate the Establishment Clause.104 These 
cases are fairly short, simple, and self-explanatory. For example, when the 
Governor of Maryland appointed Roy Torcaso to the office of the Notary Public, 
Torcaso was refused his commission because he would not declare his belief in 
God as required by Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland 
Constitution.105 Torcaso brought suit alleging a violation of the Establishment 
Clause and had his commission delivered pursuant to a unanimous ruling from 
the Supreme Court.106 Writing for the Court, Justice Black identified the 
forbidden content inherent in the state action: the creation of a religious test for 
 
 101. Clark, supra note 29, at 964. Lack of impartiality as an indicator of impermissible purpose 
in Establishment Clause cases relates to the contentious idea of state neutrality toward religion. 
Neutrality, however, stems from the debate over the Founders’ original intent in drafting the First 
Amendment and plays a much more decisive role in Establishment Clause cases. 
 102. Cf. Strauss, supra note 93, at 940–41. 
 103. See, e.g., Richard Schragger, Unconstitutional Government Speech 11 (Univ. Va. Sch. L. Pub. L. 
& Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 2019-56), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3468469 [https://perma.cc/MKH3-6EAQ] 
(describing an instance of overlap among the government impartiality, classification, and 
subordination indicia). 
 104. E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424–25 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495–
96 (1961). Facial violations of the Establishment Clause are those violations that are “plainly 
intentional.” See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 885 (2004). 
 105. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489. 
 106. Id. at 496. 
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those serving in the state government of Maryland.107 While Justice Black further 
laid out why this provision of the Maryland Constitution violated the 
Establishment Clause,108 this explanation is dictum because the opinion had 
already declared the religious test to be a per se violation of the Establishment 
Clause.109 
2.  Secular Purpose 
Next, the Supreme Court has decided cases in which the challenged action had 
a secular purpose. Juxtaposing the cases of McGowan v. Maryland110 and Mueller v. 
Allen111 demonstrates the manner in which Establishment Clause cases involving 
secular purpose have evolved over time. At the time of McGowan, the Maryland 
legislature had passed a statute commonly known as a “Sunday Closing Law,” 
which was a criminal statute that “generally proscribe[d] all labor, business and 
other commercial activities on Sunday.”112 Petitioners in the case were seven 
employees of a large discount department store indicted by the state of Maryland 
for selling “a three-ring loose-leaf binder, a can of floor wax, a stapler and staples, 
and a toy submarine” on a Sunday.113 Of the legal theories advanced by the 
petitioners, the most critical was Maryland’s the asserted violation of the 
Establishment Clause for enacting and enforcing its Sunday Closing Law.114 
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren admitted that Sunday Closing 
Laws undoubtedly originated with religious purpose and detailed such evidence 
all the way back to thirteenth-century British common law.115 However, Chief 
Justice Warren interestingly framed the issue as “whether present Sunday 
legislation, having undergone extensive changes from the earliest forms, still 
retains its religious character.”116 The Court ultimately held that, based on their 
language and operative effects, the Sunday Closing Laws had become “part and 
parcel of this great governmental concern wholly apart from their original 
purposes or connotations” and had the secular purpose of “provid[ing] a uniform 
day of rest for all citizens.”117 
The McGowan decision laid the framework for courts to consider purpose in 
 
 107. Id. at 489–91. Justice Black spelled out that the Court’s decision was made under the 
Establishment Clause and not the No Religious Test Clause of Article VI, Clause 3. See id. at 489 
n.1. 
 108. Id. at 490. The Court pointed to indicia of impermissible purpose in the religious test, as 
the test both (1) classifies the population into theists and non-theists, and (2) causes the government 
to be partial. See id. 
 109. See id. at 490–91. 
 110. 366 U.S. 420, 444–45, 452–53 (1961). McGowan was one of the “Sunday Closing Cases,” 
along with Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 
617 (1961), and Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). 
 111. 463 U.S. 388, 402–03 (1983). 
 112. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 422. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 431. 
 115. See id. at 431–35, 446–48. 
 116. Id. at 431. 
 117. Id. at 445, 447–48. Chief Justice Warren added, “[T]he fact that this day is Sunday, a day of 
particular significance for the dominant Christian sects, does not bar the State from achieving its 
secular goals.” Id. 
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Establishment Clause cases until Lemon. The McGowan framework proved quite 
favorable for those defending against claims of establishment of religion, as the 
Court found a secular purpose in nearly every case it heard up until the 
introduction of the “endorsement test” in Lynch v. Donnelly.118 By the time Lemon 
controlled Establishment Clause analysis, a more representative case in which the 
Supreme Court identified a secular purpose in state action was Mueller v. Allen.119 
The Mueller petitioners were a group of Minnesota taxpayers suing the state 
regarding a law permitting taxpayers to deduct certain expenses from their gross 
incomes related to educating their children.120 The challengers took issue with the 
statute allowing taxpayers to send their children to private sectarian schools while 
also deducting education-related expenses.121 As such, the petitioners brought suit 
against the state of Minnesota for allegedly violating the Establishment Clause.122 
Writing for the Court, then-Justice Rehnquist determined the statute in 
question satisfied all three prongs of the Lemon test and, therefore, did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.123 In scrutinizing the statute’s purpose, Justice 
Rehnquist remarked that “little time need[ed] be spent” conducting such 
examination because the purpose of similar government assistance programs had 
been previously upheld.124 Justice Rehnquist then quickly enunciated four 
possible secular purposes attributable to the statute and, having satisfied the 
purpose prong of the Lemon test, proceeded with the rest of the analysis.125 
Mueller indicated a key change from McGowan: the Court began dedicating 
significantly less time analyzing a law’s purpose, instead preferring to defer to 
governmental bodies as to the purpose of an action.126 This hesitancy to scrutinize 
for purpose likely reflects the Court’s “reluctance to attribute unconstitutional 
motives . . . particularly when a plausible secular purpose . . . may be discerned 
from the face of the statute.”127 Even though this shift indicates that purpose is 
much less likely to be dispositive in Establishment Clause cases, it “nevertheless 
serves an important function.”128 
 
 118. 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (combining the purpose and effect 
prongs of the Lemon test). 
 119. See 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983). 
 120. Id. at 391–92. 
 121. Id. at 392. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. at 394–404. 
 124. See id. at 394. 
 125. See id. at 395. Justice Rehnquist noted that the statute did not expressly state a legislative 
purpose and its legislative history offered “few unambiguous indications of actual intent.” Id. at 395 
n.4. 
 126. See id. at 394–95. 
 127. Id. In fact, the Supreme Court has only directly questioned a statute’s stated purpose three 
times since Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See McCreary County v. ACLU 
of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 868–75 (2005); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585–94 (1987); Stone v. 
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41–43 (1980) (per curiam). 
 128. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The purpose 
requirement “reminds government that when it acts it should do so without endorsing a particular 
religious belief or practice that all citizens do not share.” Id. at 75–76. 
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3.  Primary or Preeminent Secular Purpose 
The third purpose category includes those cases in which the challenged statute 
or governmental action is characterized by a primary or preeminent secular 
purpose.129 When the Justices conducted purpose analysis in the first three 
decades of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence, they would determine 
whether a governmental action possessed either a secular or religious purpose.130 
Once the Court’s approach began to morph in the mid-1980s, the rigidity of the 
binary classification slackened and the Court began to designate state action as 
having primarily secular purposes and primarily religious purposes. 
Emblematic of the cases in which the Justices identified a primary secular 
purpose is Lynch v. Donnelly.131 In Lynch, a group of residents from Pawtucket, 
Rhode Island, brought suit against the downtown retail merchants’ association 
for a Christmas display erected to celebrate the holiday season.132 The residents 
took issue mainly with the perpetual inclusion of a crèche in the holiday display, 
claiming the crèche ran afoul of the Establishment Clause.133 The crèche was one 
part of the display, together with, among other things, “a Santa Claus house, 
reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, 
cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy 
bear, hundreds of colored lights, [and] a large banner that read[] ‘SEASONS 
GREETINGS.’”134 
Writing for a divided court, Chief Justice Burger found no violation of the 
Establishment Clause.135 The Chief Justice focused the inquiry narrowly, 
determining the crèche must be examined in relation to the “context of the 
Christmas season.”136 While not denying that religious purpose could be 
attributed to the display, the Court held the district court’s finding—that the 
crèche had no possible secular purpose—was “clearly erroneous.”137 The primary 
purposes of the crèche—“to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origins of that 
Holiday”—were valid, secular purposes.138 
The result in Lynch has been subjected to significant criticism,139 some of which 
 
 129. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2085 (2019); Van Orden v. Perry, 
545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 607, 622 (1988); Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 707 (1984). 
 130. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (secular purpose); Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 U.S. 97, 107–08 (1968) (religious purpose). 
 131. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687. 
 132. Id. at 671. The display was located at “the heart of the [town’s] shopping district.” Id. 
 133. See id. at 671–72. A crèche is “a nativity scene, often displayed at Christmas, consisting of a 
representation of the infant Jesus in the manger, with attending figures.” Crèche, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2014). Along with secular symbols, the crèche “consist[ed] of the traditional 
figures, including the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals.” Lynch, 
465 U.S. at 671. 
 134. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671. 
 135. Id. at 687. 
 136. Id. at 679. 
 137. See id. at 681 & n.6. 
 138. See id. at 681. 
 139. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 5, at 514–23, 532–41; Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, 
and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 
269–76 (1987). 
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refers to the holding as the “‘Saint Nicholas too’ test” or the “two plastic reindeer 
rule.”140 Though this outcome might seem curious or even unprincipled,141 there 
are certainly viable justifications for the decision in light of precedent and 
history.142 Nevertheless, this finding of primary secular purpose stands today and 
served as the model in two other Supreme Court cases.143 
4.  Religious Purpose 
The fourth category of purpose within Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
includes cases involving government action with a religious purpose144 analogous 
to those involving government action with secular purposes. Wallace v. Jaffree is 
emblematic of these cases.145 In Wallace, Ishmael Jaffree sued the state of Alabama 
on behalf of his children who “had been subjected to various acts of religious 
indoctrination” at school—specifically, their teacher had led the class in daily 
prayers and the “children were exposed to ostracism from their peer group class 
members” by not participating.146 The litigation eventually made it to the 
Supreme Court.147 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens held the Alabama law was 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.148 In conducting the Court’s 
purpose analysis, Justice Stevens found only a religious—and thereby 
impermissible—purpose.149 The majority found this religious purpose through 
several pieces of evidence. First, the semantic makeup of the statute plainly 
indicated religious purpose.150 Next, the historical context and the evolving 
statutory language across multiple drafts signaled a purposeful promotion of 
religion by the state legislature.151 Moreover, and most notably, Justice Stevens 
 
 140. See Daniel Parish, Comment, Private Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 
260 n.52 (1994). 
 141. See William Van Alstyne, Comment, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson’s Crumbling 
Wall—A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 784–85. 
 142. For instance, given Justice Rehnquist’s statement one year prior in Mueller regarding purpose 
and deference to legislatures, the Lynch Court could have exhibited greater deference as to the holiday 
display in Pawtucket. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686–87 (2005); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 
602–03 (1988). 
 144. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 
489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40–42 (1985). 
 145. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59–61. 
 146. Id. at 42. This “ostracism,” more generally classified as subordination, was one of three 
indicia of impermissible purpose present in the case, along with classification and lack of impartiality. 
See id. at 59–60. 
 147. The statute at issue read, in relevant part: 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools, 
the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held may announce that 
a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for 
meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activities shall 
be engaged in. 
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1982) (repealed in 1998). 
 148. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 61. 
 149. See id. at 59–60. 
 150. Id. at 58–59. 
 151. See id. 
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looked to the legislative record and official statements of the bill’s sponsor, who, 
when asked if there were any other purpose for the legislation other than 
returning voluntary prayer to public schools, answered, “No, I did not have no 
[sic] other purpose in mind.”152 Further, evidence of pretext played a key role in 
finding religious purpose in the enactment because “[n]o one suggest[ed] that the 
statute was [any]thing but a meaningless or irrational act.”153 Taking this evidence 
together with the statute’s effects,154 the Justices found little difficulty identifying 
the statute’s purpose as religious—and thereby unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause.155 
5.  Primary or Preeminent Religious Purpose 
The fifth type of purpose category in these cases involves government actions 
with a primary or preeminent religious purpose.156 The Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe case exemplifies the regular approach the Court takes in these 
limited instances.157 The plaintiffs—a Mormon student, a Catholic student, and 
their mothers—filed suit following a vote by the students of Santa Fe High School 
to allow prayer at home football games.158 The question before the Supreme Court 
was “[w]hether [Santa Fe Independent School District]’s policy permitting 
student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate[d] the Establishment 
Clause.”159 
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens concluded that the policy was 
incompatible with the Establishment Clause because of the predominance of the 
practice’s innate religious purpose.160 The majority turned to different pieces of 
evidence in locating this purpose: first, the policy’s text reinforced the perception 
that the school was encouraging the prayer in question.161 Second, Justice Stevens 
looked to the procedural evidence of the policy, noting significantly that the stated 
purpose was “to solemnize the event,”162 and that the changes to the policy 
appeared to demonstrate the school’s desire “to preserve the practice of prayer 
before football games.”163 The Court determined that these pieces of evidence, 
together with the effectual evidence,164 indicated the policy’s purpose to be 
primarily religious and, therefore, unconstitutional under the Establishment 
 
 152. Id. at 57; see Huq, supra note 75, at 1270 (citing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 57–58). 
 153. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59. 
 154. Id. at 42. 
 155. See id. at 59–61. This case set the model for how the Court would proceed in cases in which 
the Justices identified a religious purpose in a statute. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 
583–84 (1987). 
 156. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 595–97 (1987). Development of the primary-
religious-purpose designation evolved similarly to that of the primary secular purpose. 
 157. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 317. 
 158. Id. at 294, 297. 
 159. Id. at 301. 
 160. See id. at 309–10 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). 
 161. Id. at 308; see Huq, supra note 75, at 1274 n.259. 
 162. Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 306. 
 163. Id. at 309. 
 164. Three indicia of impermissible purpose were present in the case: classification, 
subordination, and lack of impartiality. See id. at 305. 
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Clause.165 
6.  Remaining Assortment 
The sixth and final purpose category of cases consists of those decisions that do 
not fall neatly into any of the purpose categories. Because these cases are relatively 
inapposite to the analysis in this Comment, little attention is paid to them. 
Nevertheless, identifying these cases is important for comprehensiveness. One 
type of case in this catch-all category is that in which the challenged governmental 
action is not analyzed for purpose at all.166 Such was the case in Estate of Thornton 
v. Caldor, Inc., in which the Court invalidated the statute in question for violating 
the effects prong of the Lemon test167 and never analyzed the statute’s purpose.168 
Other cases in this group involve engaging purpose analysis but not coming to a 
definitive conclusion as to the purpose of an action.169 There are also cases 
involving some substantive analysis of the Establishment Clause but were decided 
on different grounds.170 Another type of case not fitting uniformly into the five 
main purpose types is that involving the intersection of the Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clauses.171 For instance, the outcome in Trinity Lutheran Church v. 
Comer depends upon a hybridized judicial theory that incorporates both Religion 
Clauses.172 
Finally, some Establishment Clause cases set aside conventional purpose 
analysis when certain exceptions apply.173 This result does not occur frequently.174 
 
 165. See id. at 309. Between religious purpose and primary or preeminent religious purpose, the 
Court has struck down government actions and enactments on six occasions. See ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 85–86 (2013). 
 166. See, e.g., Est. of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985). 
 167. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (“First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (first citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 
U.S. 236, 243 (1968); and then quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). These 
three elements, or “prongs,” of the Lemon test are referred to as the “purpose,” “effects,” and 
“excessive entanglement” prongs, respectively. E.g., Amy J. Alexander, When Life Gives You the Lemon 
Test: An Overview of the Lemon Test and Its Application, 3 PHX. L. REV. 641, 643 (2010). 
 168. See Est. of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 708–10. 
 169. See, e.g., Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 482 (1973). 
 170. See, e.g., Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761–70 (1995) (free 
speech grounds). 
 171. See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25 
(2017); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719–20 (2005). These types of cases are characterized by 
the ability to “play in the joints” of the Religion Clauses. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 669; see also Kent 
Greenawalt, Speech and Exercise by Private Individuals and Organizations, 72 SMU L. REV. 397, 398 
(2019) (“[P]rotecting free exercise ties to the Establishment Clause’s premise that government should 
not favor one particular religion over others . . . .”). For greater discussion of the intersection between 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, see generally KENT GREENAWALT, WHEN FREE EXERCISE 
AND NONESTABLISHMENT CONFLICT (2017). 
 172. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2019–21; see also Richard W. 
Garnett & Jackson C. Blais, Religious Freedom and Recycled Tires: The Meaning and Implications of Trinity 
Lutheran, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105, 120–30 (analyzing what the Trinity Lutheran decision 
portends for “playing in the joints” of the Religion Clauses). 
 173. See, e.g., Marc O. DeGirolami, The Traditions of American Constitutional Law, 95 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1123, 1129–34, 1145–48 (2020). 
 174. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
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For instance, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the 
Court officially recognized the ministerial exception to the Establishment Clause, 
which exempts religious institutions from antidiscrimination laws when hiring 
employees.175 Then there are the historical exception cases, in which the Justices 
set aside purpose analysis in favor of historical tradition as dispositive guidance.176 
In sum, while these cases do not deal directly with the concept of purpose analysis, 
they each play a particular role in fully understanding the Court’s approach to 
purpose examination in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
While these purpose categories begin to make some sense of the entropic 
jurisprudential array that is the modern Establishment Clause canon, what can be 
taken away from these groupings? Drawing conclusions from this varied and broad 
body of case law would likely be helpful—up to a point. Breaking down these cases 
by the three criteria outlined above177 sheds greater light on this byzantine area of 
law. 
B.  ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES BY CONCEPTIONS OF PURPOSE 
To start, the subjective approach is the least frequently invoked notion of how 
judges discern purpose in Establishment Clause cases. In fact, the Court has 
drawn its conclusion as to purpose “subjectively” in only one case: Board of 
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet.178 The case involved an 
“unusual Act”179 which “empowered [the] locally elected board of education to 
take such action as opening schools and closing them, hiring teachers, prescribing 
textbooks, establishing disciplinary rules, and raising property taxes to fund 
operations.”180 The statute’s peculiar nature came from the fact that the residents 
of the school district were members of the Satmar Hasidic religious sect.181 
In the opinion for the Court, Justice Souter examined the evidence to 
reconstruct what he subjectively believed to be the purpose with which the New 
York State Assembly and Governor had acted.182 While the enactors did not 
explicitly state a religious purpose, the majority found the textual and contextual 
evidence relevant to the statute’s delegation of civil authority to be based on 
religious affiliation, just not in express terms.183 Justice Souter considered three 
 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 175. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89; see also Brian M. Murray, A Tale of Two Inquiries: The 
Ministerial Exception After Hosanna-Tabor, 68 SMU L. REV. 1123, 1126–47 (2015) (analyzing Hosanna-
Tabor and its application in the lower courts). 
 176. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 n.10 (2005) (“In special 
instances we have found good reason to hold governmental action legitimate even where its manifest 
purpose was presumably religious.”); see also Krista M. Pikus, Hopeful Clarity or Hopeless Disarray?: An 
Examination of Town of Greece v. Galloway and the Establishment Clause, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 387, 
402–08 (2015) (analyzing the case’s implications). 
 177. See supra Parts III.A.–C. 
 178. 512 U.S. 687, 709–10 (1994). 
 179. Id. at 690. 
 180. Id. at 693. 
 181. Id. The Court describes the Satmar Hasidic sect in depth in the first section of its opinion. 
See id. at 690–91. 
 182. See id. at 698–705. 
 183. See id. at 699. 
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other facts significant: (1) the State Assembly knew the incorporated village 
remained exclusively Satmar; (2) carving the school district in this manner ran 
counter to customary practice; and (3) the act originated as a special act of the 
State Assembly.184 From these facts and other textual and contextual evidence, the 
Court identified a subjective legislative purpose to the New York State Assembly’s 
action: the legislators intended to define “a political subdivision and hence the 
qualification for its franchise by a religious test, resulting in a purposeful and 
forbidden fusion of governmental and religious functions.”185 
The limited nature of the subjective conception of purpose in modern 
Establishment Clause cases makes two things clear. First, the Supreme Court 
reluctantly engages in subjective guesswork as to the purpose with which 
government actors operate in this context. Second, even when the Justices 
subjectively identify governmental purpose, they ground the assessment in 
concrete evidence.186 
The second conceptual understanding of purpose—objectively imputing the 
collective purpose of governmental actors based primarily on the face of the action 
in question—plays the most significant role in the context of the Establishment 
Clause. In the vast majority of these cases, the Justices derive purpose from the 
semantic context and stated purpose of such action.187 For instance, the Court 
upheld the Higher Education Facilities Act in Tilton v. Richardson, finding the 
statute in question applied to “all colleges and universities regardless of any 
affiliation with or sponsorship by a religious body.”188 In examining the law’s 
purpose, Chief Justice Burger looked to the text of the statute and the legislature’s 
stated statutory purpose.189 Finding the statutory text and procedural evidence to 
support Congress’s asserted purpose of ensuring the “fullest development of the[] 
intellectual capacities” of “this and future generations of American youth,”190 the 
Court deemed this purpose secular and thereby valid.191 
Tilton demonstrates three general trends in Establishment Clause cases in 
which purpose is objectively imputed by judges on the face of the challenged 
governmental action. First, when the Court utilizes this conception of purpose, 
the Justices tend not to engage in extensive purpose examination if the stated 
purpose of the statute is facially neutral.192 Relatedly, the Court will likely defer 
to the governmental actor or body’s stated purpose out of judicial concern 
regarding “the legitimate objectives of any [governmental actions being] subverted 
 
 184. See id. at 699–701. 
 185. See id. at 702 (internal quotation marks omitted). For further discussion of Kiryas Joel and 
its unique substantive issues, see Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27–57 (1996). 
 186. See, e.g., infra notes 189–190 and accompanying text. 
 187. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 661–62 (2002); Corp. of the Presiding 
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987); Tilton v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684–89 (1971). 
 188. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 676. 
 189. Id. at 675. 
 190. Id. at 678 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 701 (1964)). 
 191. Id. at 679. 
 192. See, e.g., id. at 678–80. 
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by conscious design or lax enforcement”193—standing alone, these concerns do not 
“warrant striking down a statute as unconstitutional.”194 Finally, when the 
Supreme Court conceives of purpose by objective determination on the face of an 
action, the Court will rarely declare the action in question unconstitutional under 
the Establishment Clause.195 
Lastly, there is the expressive-meaning conception of purpose in Establishment 
Clause cases, which arises more often than subjective conceptions of purpose but 
less often than objectively imputed conceptions of purpose.196 Nevertheless, 
scholars turn to some Establishment Clause cases as the clearest examples of how 
the Supreme Court examines the overlap of expressive theory and purpose 
analysis.197 For instance, in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, Justice 
Stevens focused on the school district’s message that seemingly endorsed prayer 
at Santa Fe High School.198 Because an objective observer would have reasonably 
perceived the pregame message as a public expression of state-sanctioned prayer 
in public schools, the Court imputed such expressive purpose to the school 
district and found the purpose in question violative of the Establishment 
Clause.199 
Santa Fe demonstrates two key takeaways regarding expressive purpose in 
Establishment Clause cases. First, while the application of this notion of purpose 
is relatively new and novel, the theory is and remains a viable manner in which 
the Court identifies purpose in this type of case.200 Additionally, in all but one 
modern Establishment Clause case since Lemon,201 the Supreme Court has found 
violations of the Establishment Clause when expressive theories guided the 
Justices in identifying the purpose of an action or enactment. 
C.  ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES BY EVIDENCE OF PURPOSE 
The extent to which the type of evidence plays a role in identifying purpose in 
Establishment Clause cases is jumbled but nevertheless meaningful. While no 
significant pattern or formula wholly explains the Court’s decision-making 
process, important conclusions can still be drawn. 
First, no necessary condition exists as to what kind (or how much) purpose 
evidence is needed to locate purpose in an Establishment Clause case. For 
instance, the Court accounted for all five types of evidence to find a religious 
 
 193. Id. at 679. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See, e.g., id. at 679. But see, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam). The 
Supreme Court has made clear that a statement of legislative purpose warrants scrutiny to ensure its 
sincerity and that the stated purpose is not a “sham.” See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–
87 (1987); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 196. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961). 
 197. See, e.g., Note, The Establishment Clause and the Chilling Effect, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1338, 
1343–46 (2020); Anderson & Pildes, supra note 69, at 1545–51; Fallon, supra note 8, at 549–50. 
 198. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 309–10. 
 199. See id. at 308–10; Fallon, supra note 8, at 549–50. 
 200. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 308–10. 
 201. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984). 
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purpose in Wallace v. Jaffree,202 but the Justices examined only textual evidence in 
Larson v. Valente to reach the same outcome.203 It is clear the Court may examine 
textual, contextual, procedural, pretextual, and effectual evidence when 
identifying purpose in an Establishment Clause case, but the Justices will not 
always consider all evidence presented by the parties indicative of purpose.204 
When the Court does identify purpose, however, the analysis almost always 
involves textual evidence.205 The critical role semantic evidence plays in 
Establishment Clause cases likely occurs for three reasons. First, text is the most 
clear and concrete type of purpose evidence—it is almost always the only 
“objective” basis of evidence.206 Second, using textual evidence to justify the 
outcome of a case resonates with Justices who are less likely to invoke other types 
of purpose evidence.207 Finally, some on the Court certainly take solace in the 
“values of democratic legitimacy, interpretive fidelity, and judicial restraint” 
textual evidence provides.208 
While practically all Justices on the Supreme Court rely on text in their 
Establishment Clause decisions, they diverge as to their reliance on contextual 
and procedural evidence. This methodological difference may seem logical given 
the Justices’ distinctive methods of interpretation, but the degree to which 
contextual and procedural evidence forms the basis of a decision can have 
significant consequences. Trump v. Hawaii recently demonstrated these potential 
and very real effects.209 
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court found President Trump’s “travel ban” to be a 
legitimate exercise of executive authority and to comport with the strictures of the 
Establishment Clause.210 The evidence used to examine purpose in Chief Justice 
Roberts’s majority opinion and Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion 
illuminates the distinct analytical processes utilized to decide the case. In his 
 
 202. 472 U.S. 38, 55–61 (1985). 
 203. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246–47, 253–54 (1982). 
 204. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577–91 (2014) (forgoing contextual 
and effectual purpose evidence). 
 205. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 75, at 1267 nn.229–30 (collecting cases). 
 206. See id. at 1269. 
 207. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 430–31 
(2005) (explaining the importance of text as a means of interpretation). For example, in McGowan, 
the Court voted 8–1 to uphold a Sunday Closing law. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 
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exception, I cannot find that the Constitution compels it.” Id. at 520. 
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opinion, Chief Justice Roberts identified legitimate secular purposes for the travel 
ban and therefore upheld the executive order under the Establishment Clause.211 
The Chief Justice explicitly acknowledged the contention made by the travel ban’s 
challengers that “a series of statements by the President and his advisers casting 
doubt on the official objective of the [travel ban]” might evidence an illegitimate 
religious purpose under the Establishment Clause;212 ultimately, Chief Justice 
Roberts was unpersuaded by this procedural evidence of purpose because the text 
was “facially neutral toward religion” and the travel ban was “a matter within the 
core of executive responsibility.”213 
By contrast, Justice Sotomayor forcefully maintained that President Trump’s 
travel ban violated the Establishment Clause.214 Justice Sotomayor asserted that 
Supreme Court precedent mandated consideration of textual, contextual, 
procedural, and effectual evidence when reviewing an alleged violation of the 
Establishment Clause.215 After a comprehensive recitation of the procedural-
purpose evidence from the Trump campaign and the early days of the Trump 
Presidency,216 Justice Sotomayor concluded that the primary purpose of the travel 
ban was “to disfavor Islam and its adherents by excluding them from the country” 
and, therefore, the travel ban ran afoul of the Establishment Clause.217 The 
contrasting approaches taken by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Sotomayor 
demonstrate how the types of purpose evidence considered and the weight given 
to each can significantly impact the outcome of Establishment Clause cases.218 
A final notable observation relates to the inclusion of pretextual and effectual 
evidence in an Establishment Clause opinion. Aside from the Sunday Closing 
Law cases and Agostini v. Felton,219 every case that considered effectual evidence 
ultimately struck down the governmental action in question.220 Similarly, every 
case that considered pretextual evidence ultimately invalidated the action under 
review.221 And not surprisingly, cases examining effectual evidence tend to 
consider pretextual evidence, and vice versa.222 
Examining evidence of purpose in Establishment Clause cases clearly 
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demonstrates significant aspects of the Supreme Court’s approach to this 
extensive strand of case law. The most critical conclusion, however, is that the 
approach taken towards identifying purpose in Establishment Clause cases may 
be the root of the jurisprudential cacophony. Specifically, the way in which the 
Justices utilize contextual, procedural, and effectual evidence to evince purpose 
may be the very cause of the convoluted nature in this area of law. Establishment 
Clause cases are extraordinarily fact-dependent; as such, when one claims that 
decisions in these cases rely upon the Justices on the Court or the framework 
implemented by the majority, it is more accurate to conclude that the types of 
purpose evidence the Justices are willing to consider explain the Establishment 
Clause’s labyrinthine nature. 
D.  ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES BY INDICIA OF IMPERMISSIBLE PURPOSE 
For the most part, looking to indicia of impermissible purpose in 
Establishment Clause cases contributes little to better understanding the Court’s 
approach in this area. However, two useful conclusions are apparent. First, when 
a decision in an Establishment Clause case mentions or discusses just one of the 
indicia, the Court is much more likely to find a challenged action constitutionally 
impermissible.223 Whether inclusion of one or more of these indicia of 
impermissible purpose in an opinion is a cause or a result of the Court’s decision 
regarding the law under examination remains to be seen but is noteworthy 
nevertheless. Second, when the Justices discuss indicia at all in Establishment 
Clause decisions, the two indicia most frequently invoked are lack of 
impartiality224 and classification,225 respectively. 
A natural question in light of the limited role these indicia play in 
Establishment Clause analysis is, why so? The answer is likely two-fold. First, these 
indicia skew more closely to policy considerations than interpretive canons, and 
the Justices take precautions to avoid the appearance of “legislating from the 
bench,”226 especially when handling sensitive cases like those involving the 
Establishment Clause. As well, keeping discussion of these indicia to a minimum 
helps prevent “branding the wrongdoer,”227 a potential phenomenon only further 
intensified by the talismanic effect Supreme Court rulings have on public affairs 
and jurisprudential development.228 
Taking these observations together reaffirms the previous discussion: the core 
justification for purpose analysis in the Establishment Clause canon (and 
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constitutional law as a whole) originates in the concern for the legitimacy of the 
Court and the judicial branch. By invoking these indicia of impermissible purpose 
when striking down a statute under the Establishment Clause, the Court 
communicates to litigants and the American people that it will weigh in on the 
church-and-state debate only when entirely necessary—to legitimate the very nature 
of American governmental institutions and to ensure “equal concern and respect” 
for all those subject to the laws of the United States.229 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence and constitutional purpose 
analysis are intricate and involved and attempting to synthesize and study them 
creates an entirely new analytical Leviathan. But the foregoing analysis 
demonstrates some overarching conclusions and forges new questions to be 
explored. 
First, purpose has not been the dispositive analytical component in the vast 
majority of Establishment Clause cases the Supreme Court has decided.230 Albeit 
an element in the general framework used by the Justices, purpose is the deciding 
factor only on occasion.231 Second, when conceptualizing the purpose of 
governmental action in the Establishment Clause context, the Court tends to do 
so by imputing a collective purpose of the enacting body to make sense of the 
particular action.232 When the Justices identify purpose through this “objective” 
imputation, purpose is rarely the dispositive factor.233 However, when the Court 
finds purpose through the expressive conception,234 purpose tends to be 
dispositive and usually leads to the invalidation of the action in question.235 
As well, the Court has engaged all five types of purpose evidence—textual, 
contextual, procedural, pretextual, and effectual—in its Establishment Clause 
analyses. When the Justices mention or discuss pretextual or effectual evidence in 
deriving purpose, the decision will most likely strike down the governmental 
action in question.236 Additionally, even though procedural and contextual 
purpose evidence are most likely to swing the outcome of a case,237 these types of 
evidence, while important to consider, are not always dispositive in Establishment 
Clause purpose analyses.238 Finally, while indicia of impermissible purpose do not 
play a significantly active role in most modern Establishment Clause cases, the 
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mention or discussion of religious animus, classification, subordination, or lack 
of government impartiality in Establishment Clause decisions frequently foretells 
the finding of impermissible purpose, which normally leads to the invalidation of 
the action in question.239 
The insight gained from this analysis is beneficial for better comprehension of 
this area of constitutional law, but several crucial questions spring from these 
findings. For instance, how does the type of evidence and the emphasis on 
particular forms of evidence affect the conception of purpose the Court utilizes 
in identifying purpose? A more definite answer to this question would be 
instructive for litigants defending or bringing challenges against actions pursuant 
to the Establishment Clause. As well, how much of modern Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is fact-dependent and, therefore, simply conditional upon the 
members of the Supreme Court at the time of a decision? And finally, even if the 
Court overrules Lemon, will purpose still play a role in Establishment Clause 
analysis, and, if so, how significant will that role be?240 
These questions simply begin an inquiry into Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence from a different angle. Yet even after analyzing this area of law from 
numerous perspectives, it is difficult to observe any strong correlation between 
these analyses and the outcomes in these cases. Even more challenging would be 
to ignore the possibility that these distinct analytical approaches and the 
importance given to each remains entirely at the discretion of judges, likely based 
upon concern for the institutional legitimacy of the Judiciary. 
Academics and legal commentators continue to warn of enduring threats to 
the Establishment Clause,241 and there is anticipation that similar challenges will 
persist in reaching the Supreme Court.242 The Bladensburg Cross case elicited 
seven separate opinions and demonstrated diverging views on the Establishment 
Clause,243 further stressing that “the meaning of the Establishment Clause is in 
play.”244 Regardless of how vigorously the Court attempts to clarify Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, legal scholars, practitioners, and the American populace as 
a whole will not be of “one language and a common speech”245 on this issue for 
some time to come. 
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